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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1766, the British Crown permitted the issuance of general 
warrants for both the arrest of its subjects and the search of its subjects’ 
homes.1 These general warrants gave soldiers and government officials 
“blanket authority”2 to either arrest “unspecified persons suspected of 
committing a named offense”3 or search any home for “whatever 
evidence could be found of interest to the Crown.”4 Parliament abolished 
the use of general warrants after John Wilkes successfully recovered 
monetary damages on a claim for libel against a government official who 
executed a search of his home and seized his personal papers pursuant to 
a general warrant.5 Despite this “landmark[] of . . . liberty,” the abuses of 
the British Crown were “fresh in the memories” of American citizens 
after they won their independence.6 Consequently, American citizens 
sought to assure that their new federal government would not follow the 
British Crown and disregard what they viewed as their inalienable right 
                                                                                                             
 1 See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–26 (1886); Paul Savoy, 
When Criminal Rights Go Wrong; Forget Liberal. Forget Conservative. Think Common 
Sense, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 1989, available at http://encyclopedia.farlex.com 
/general+warrants (follow “When criminal rights go wrong; forget liberal. Forget 
conservative. ...” hyperlink). 
 2 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 n.21 (1980) (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 
U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965)). 
 3 General Warrants, THE UNABRIDGED HUTCHINSON ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), 
http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/general+warrants (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). 
 4 Michael J. Bulzomi, Protecting Personal Privacy: Drawing the Line Between 
People and Containers, THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Feb. 1, 2006, available 
at http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/general+warrants (follow “Protecting personal privacy: 
drawing the line between people and ...” hyperlink). 
 5 See Boyd, 116 U.S. 625–29 (discussing both the events leading up to the search of 
Wilkes’s home and Lord Camden’s 1765 court decision). 
 6 Id. at 625–26. 
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to be secure in both their persons and in their homes.7 The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution addressed this concern.8 
The text of the Fourth Amendment contains two clauses: the first 
protects a citizen’s right to be free from unreasonable arrests and 
searches, while the second requires that warrants be particular and 
supported by probable cause.9 Specifically, the first clause provides: (1) 
protection of one’s person from unreasonable arrest or “governmental 
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally 
applied;”10 and (2) protection of one’s place from “the unjustified 
intrusion of the police.”11 The second clause recognizes the need for 
balance between citizens’ rights under the first clause and the 
investigative needs of law enforcement officials. Since the adoption of 
the Fourth Amendment, courts have struggled to maintain this delicate 
balance. 
The Fourth Amendment’s protections of one’s person and one’s 
place intersect in Payton v. New York.12 In Payton, the United States 
Supreme Court briefly addressed what the appropriate level of protection 
is for a suspect’s home where police have the authority to arrest the 
suspect.13 The Court held that “an arrest warrant founded on probable 
cause carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the 
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”14 
Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent resolution of this issue, a split has 
developed in the federal circuit courts concerning the Supreme Court’s 
meaning of “reason to believe” in Payton.15 The Federal Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United States. v. Gorman16 that 
Payton’s “reason to believe” standard “embodies the same standard of 
reasonableness inherent in probable cause.”17 However, all other circuits 
that have considered the issue, including the Sixth Circuit in United 
States v. Pruitt,18 have held that a lesser standard applies.19 The Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 7 Id. See also Payton, 445 U.S. at 584 n.21 (citing Stanford, 379 U.S. at 481–82). 
 8 Payton, 445 U.S. at 583. 
 9 Id. at 584; U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 10 Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998); See also Torres v. 
City of Madera, 524 F.3d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 11 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981). 
 12 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).   
 13 See id. at 603. 
 14 Id. (emphasis added). 
 15 See United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 16 United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2002).   
 17 Id. at 1111. 
 18 United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 19 Id. at 482–83. See also  United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62–63 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216–17 
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Court has offered no further guidance as to whether Payton’s “reason to 
believe” language requires an arresting officer to establish probable 
cause or merely Pruitt’s lesser standard.  Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether police officers or magistrates are best equipped to conduct the 
fact sensitive analysis in these situations. 
Although the federal circuits have adopted different standards, 
probable cause and Pruitt’s lesser standard may produce a different 
outcome in only a small number of close cases.20 Nevertheless, the 
difference between standards is extremely important in the cases in 
which the standard applied will be outcome determinative. The Ninth 
Circuit’s adherence to a probable cause requirement is superior to the 
lesser requirement of the other circuits because: (1) probable cause is 
required to protect a suspect’s constitutional “interest in the privacy of 
his home and possessions against unjustified intrusions by the police;”21 
(2) it provides a uniform standard for situations where police seek to 
enter a private residence; 22 and (3) it provides a clear and workable 
standard for law enforcement officers.23 Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
should clarify that Payton’s “reason to believe” language requires a 
showing of probable cause. However, law enforcement officers are ill 
equipped to conduct the fact sensitive probable cause analysis because 
they are often too involved in the criminal investigation to determine 
objectively the propriety of entering a suspect’s home to execute an 
arrest warrant.24 In order to maintain an appropriate balance between 
citizens’ rights and the investigative needs of law enforcement officials, 
the Supreme Court should extend the holding of Steagald v. United 
States25—which required the issuance of a search warrant to enter the 
home of a third-party not named in the arrest warrant in order to arrest a 
suspect—to encompass situations where law enforcement officers seek to 
                                                                                                             
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995). For purposes of 
clarity, I will refer to these standards throughout this comment as the probable cause 
standard and Pruitt’s lesser standard, respectively. 
 20 See United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that the 
officers in Pruitt gathered evidence that would satisfy both standards). 
 21 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981). 
 22 See generally id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that police officers on 
patrol may stop and frisk suspicious persons based on “reasonable suspicion,” a lower 
standard than probable cause); United States v. Mondragon, 181 F. App’x. 904, 906 (11th 
Cir. 2006); 2-22 JOHN W. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 22.18 (2007). 
 23 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200, 213–14 (1979); Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 484. 
 24 See generally Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); 1-3 HALL, supra 
note 22, § 3.4, 3.9; 2-22 HALL, supra note 22, § 22.31; Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s 
Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH L. REV. 299, 301 (2002). 
 25 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).   
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enter a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant.26 The Court should 
require arresting officers to obtain a search warrant from an objective 
magistrate before entering a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant 
and thus permit the magistrate to conduct the probable cause analysis. 
Even though it would represent a radical change in the law, the Supreme 
Court should institute this additional warrant requirement because an 
arrest in one’s home implicates both the protection from unreasonable 
arrest and the protection of one’s home from unreasonable intrusion.27 
Furthermore, requiring police officers to obtain an additional warrant 
would provide a uniform application of the probable cause analysis28 
without hindering law enforcement efforts.29 
II. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A. Payton v. New York: The Appearance of “Reason to Believe” 
On January 12, 1970, New York City detectives began to 
investigate the murder of a gas station manager.30 Within two days, 
detectives gathered enough evidence to establish probable cause that 
Theodore Payton had committed the murder.31 On the morning of 
January 15, 1970, six officers went to Payton’s apartment to arrest him 
without first obtaining an arrest warrant.32 The officers discovered that 
both “light and music emanated from the apartment.”33 However, no one 
responded to their knocks on the door.34 After forcing entry into the 
apartment and determining that no one was home, the officers seized a 
bullet shell casing found in plain view.35 Payton eventually surrendered 
to police.36 At trial, the court allowed the prosecution to submit the shell 
                                                                                                             
 26 See id. at 213–16. 
 27 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588–89 (1980) (citing United States v. 
Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 
U.S. 913 (1978)) (“To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to 
all arrests, but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home.”). 
 28 See Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (citing Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); Edwards, supra note 24, at 301. 
 29 See United States v. Mondragon, 181 F. App’x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2006); 2-22 
HALL, supra note 22, § 22.31; 1-3 HALL, supra note 22, § 3.5. 
 30 Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Payton, 445 U.S. at 576–77. 
 36 Id at 577. 
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casing into evidence.37 The jury subsequently convicted Payton of 
murder.38 
In a separate incident three years later, the victims of two armed 
robberies identified Obie Riddick as their attacker.39 Police went to 
Riddick’s house on March 14 1974, to arrest him without obtaining an 
arrest warrant.40 Riddick’s son opened the door and the officers found the 
suspect in bed.41 After placing Riddick under arrest, the officers searched 
a chest of drawers next to his bed for weapons and discovered drugs.42 A 
New York trial court found Riddick guilty of narcotics related offenses.43 
The Supreme Court heard Payton’s and Riddick’s appeals in a 
consolidated action in order to determine “the constitutionality of New 
York statutes that authorize police officers to enter a private residence 
without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony 
arrest.”44 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that warrantless 
entry into one’s home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional even 
“‘when probable cause is clearly present.’”45 The Court noted that entry 
into one’s home “‘is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed.’”46 The Court found the New York Court 
of Appeals’ reasoning that a “substantial difference [exists between] the 
relative intrusiveness of an entry to search for property and an entry to 
search for a person” unpersuasive.47 Indeed, Justice Stevens stated that 
entries to search and entries to arrest “implicate the same interest in 
preserving the privacy and the sanctity of the home”48 and that the 
differences in intrusiveness between the two types of entries are “ones of 
degree rather than kind.”49 The Court held that the language of the Fourth 
Amendment gives citizens the right to “be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion,” which, absent exigent circumstances, includes 
warrantless entry into one’s home to seize persons or property.50 
                                                                                                             
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 579. 
 39 Id. at 578. 
 40 Payton, 445 U.S. at 578. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 579. 
 44 Id. at 574. 
 45 Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (1978), 
cert. denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913 (1978)). 
 46 Id. at 585 (citing United States v. United States Dist. Court., 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972)). 
 47 Id. at 589. 
 48 Id. at 588. 
 49 Id. at 589. 
 50 Payton, 445 U.S. at 589–90 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961)). 
2009] IS "REASON TO BELIEVE" PROBABLE CAUSE  443 
The Court in Payton held that police need an arrest warrant to enter 
a suspect’s home to make an arrest.51 However, the Court’s holding was 
less clear as to what law enforcement officials must establish in order to 
enter a suspect’s home after obtaining an arrest warrant. Justice Stevens 
stated that “for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded 
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter 
a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the 
suspect is within.”52 In light of the inherent ambiguity of this phrase, it is 
understandable that a split developed in the federal circuit courts as to the 
meaning of “reason to believe” in this context.53 
B. United States v. Gorman: “Reason to Believe” is Probable Cause 
In United States v. Gorman, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Payton’s 
“reason to believe” language as being equivalent to probable cause.54 In 
September or October of 2000, San Diego Police learned that a man 
named “Kenny” was using mail box keys to steal mail from residents of 
a housing complex.55 After further investigation, officers discovered that 
“Kenny” was Clarence Kenneth Gorman, an ex-convict who was in 
violation of his supervised release from prison and had an active felony 
warrant.56 The police also discovered that Gorman was living at his 
girlfriend Helen’s home on Ranchero Hills Drive.57  
Several officers went to the home on Ranchero Hills Drive on 
November 6, 2000 to arrest Gorman.58 The officers watched the 
residence for an hour after spotting Gorman’s car outside but they did not 
see him enter or leave.59 The officers knocked on the front door and 
thought they heard someone inside.60 After no one answered, the officers 
knocked on the back door.61  There is a factual dispute regarding the 
                                                                                                             
 51 See id. at 588–89. 
 52 Id. at 603 (emphasis added). 
 53 Compare United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n 
arrest warrant is sufficient to enter a residence if the officers, by looking at common 
sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances, establish a reasonable 
belief that the subject of the arrest warrant is within the residence at that time”) with 
United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ‘reason to 
believe,’ or reasonable belief, standard of Payton . . . embodies the same standard of 
reasonableness inherent in probable cause.”). 
 54 Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1111. 
 55 Id. at 1107. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1108. 
 60 Id. 
     61   Id. 
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circumstances under which they entered the house.62  One of the officers 
subsequently claimed that police entered the house only after Gorman’s 
girlfriend answered the door and, after persistent questioning, told them 
that Gorman was inside.63 However, another officer asserted that Helen 
told the police that no one was inside except for her mother and child and 
that the officers instructed her to wait outside while they entered the 
house.64 The officers found Gorman in bed and, during the arrest, 
discovered three mailbox keys and checks written to other people in his 
wallet.65 Gorman pleaded guilty to possession of a counterfeit postal key 
but preserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion 
to suppress the evidence gathered by the arresting officers “allegedly in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”66 
Writing for a majority of the Ninth Circuit, Judge Pregerson held 
that the district court applied the wrong standard to Gorman’s motion to 
suppress the evidence seized by the police.67 The court pointed out that, 
under Payton, an arresting officer must have an arrest warrant and 
“reason to believe” the suspect is present in order to enter a home to 
execute the warrant.68 However, the court stated that the district court 
erroneously interpreted “reason to believe” to mean “reasonable 
suspicion” rather than probable cause.69 Probable cause is a “common 
sense” determination as to whether there is a “fair probability” that the 
evidence [or person] sought is “located in a particular place” based on 
the “totality of the circumstances.”70  
In the opinion, Judge Pregerson highlighted the importance of the 
“located in a particular place” element of the probable cause analysis 
where police wish to enter a suspect’s home.71 The court held that a 
“particular place” for purposes of probable cause is “a particular 
building.”72 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit stated that the arresting 
officers must believe “that the subject of the arrest warrant is present [in 
                                                                                                             
     62   Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1108. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1110. 
 67 Id. at 1116. 
 68 Id. at 1111 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980); United States v. 
Albreksten, 151 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 69 Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1110, 1116. 
 70 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 71 See Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1113–14. 
 72 See id. at 1113 (citing United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 
1974)). 
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the particular building] at the time of the warrant’s execution.”73 The 
court noted that “‘[e]ntry into a person’s home is so intrusive that such 
searches always require probable cause regardless of whether some 
exception would excuse the warrant requirement.’”74 Synthesizing the 
Gates and Gorman decisions produces the probable cause standard for 
situations where police officers seek to enter a suspect’s home to execute 
an arrest warrant.  Indeed, in order to establish probable cause, police 
officers must make a common sense determination, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, that there is a fair probability that the suspect is 
presently within his home.75 The court remanded the case to the district 
court in order to determine whether the arresting officers established 
probable cause that Gorman was inside his girlfriend’s home when they 
entered.76 
C. United States v. Pruitt: “Reason to Believe” is a Lesser Standard than 
Probable Cause 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gorman, every other 
federal circuit that has considered the issue has interpreted Payton’s 
“reason to believe” language as requiring a lesser showing than probable 
cause.77 United States v. Pruitt, a recent Sixth Circuit decision, illustrates 
the position of the circuits that have adopted this lesser standard.78 In 
July 2004, Demetrius Pruitt “became a fugitive of justice” after being 
released from prison on parole and “failing to report to his parole 
officer.”79 A magistrate issued an arrest warrant for Pruitt after officers 
did not find him at his recorded address.80 In August 2004, police 
received an anonymous tip that Pruitt had relocated to another address.81 
The tipster informed police that Pruitt had been at the address within the 
past several hours and that he had drugs and a firearm in his possession.82 
After conducting surveillance for a short period of time, police stopped a 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. at 1114 n.9 (citing United States v. Litteral, 910 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1990)) 
(emphasis added). 
 74 Id. at 1113 (quoting United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 75 See id.; Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
 76 See Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1112, 1116. 
 77 United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2006); See United States v. 
Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 
(D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62–63 (5th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216–17 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 
212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 78 Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 483. 
 79 Id. at 478. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 478–79. 
 82 Id. 
446 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:437 
man they saw enter and quickly leave Pruitt’s supposed new residence.83 
The man told the officers that Pruitt was inside the house.84 Using the 
information gathered from the anonymous tipster and the man stopped 
outside the residence, a detective obtained a search warrant.85 Police 
entered the house and found Pruitt hiding in a closet along with drugs 
and a loaded gun in plain view.86 At trial, Pruitt moved to suppress the 
evidence gathered by the officers because the search warrant “lacked 
indicia of probable cause.”87 The district court initially granted Pruitt’s 
motion but subsequently denied it upon reconsideration.88 
Writing for a majority of the Sixth Circuit, Judge McKeague held 
that the district court properly denied Pruitt’s motion to suppress the 
evidence gathered during his arrest.89 The court acknowledged that the 
search warrant was invalid because the detective failed to list any facts in 
his form affidavit and the issuing court did not transcribe his sworn 
statement.90 Nevertheless, the court held that, under Payton, a search 
warrant was not necessary to enter a residence where the officers had an 
arrest warrant and “reason to believe [the suspect] was inside.”91 Judge 
McKeague pointed out that the vast majority of courts have interpreted 
“reason to believe” to mean a lesser standard than probable cause.92  
Indeed, the court noted that the Supreme Court did not use the terms 
“probable cause” and “reason to believe” interchangeably and thus 
implied that “reason to believe” is a lesser standard.93 The court 
articulated this lesser standard as requiring an arresting officer to “look[] 
at common sense factors and evaluat[e] the totality of the 
circumstances”94 in order to “establish a reasonable belief that the subject 
of the arrest warrant is within the residence at that time.”95 Applying this 
lesser standard, Judge McKeague held that the arresting officers had 
reason to believe that Pruitt was within the house at the time of his arrest 
                                                                                                             
 83 Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 479. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 480. 
 88 Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 480. 
 89 Id. at 485. 
 90 Id. at 480–81. 
 91 Id. at 482. 
 92 Id. at 483; See United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 
59, 62–63 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216–17 (8th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 93 Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 484. 
 94 Id. at 482. 
 95 Id. at 483. 
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based on the information gathered from the tipster and the man stopped 
after leaving the residence. 96 
D. Distinguishing Between Probable Cause and Pruitt’s Lesser Standard 
Although the federal circuit courts have interpreted Payton’s 
“reasonable to believe” language differently, probable cause and Pruitt’s 
lesser standard lead to the same outcome in most instances.97 For 
example, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Route,98 using Pruitt’s 
“reasonable belief” language.99  However, the decision would have been 
the same had the court applied the probable cause standard.100 
In Route, a police officer executed an arrest warrant for Route and 
Crossley at Route’s residence.101 The officer arrested Route outside the 
residence and subsequently entered the house to arrest Crossley.102 While 
searching for Crossley, the officer discovered evidence that the 
prosecution used against the defendant at trial.103 The Fifth Circuit held 
that the officer had a “reasonable belief” that Crossley lived in Route’s 
home and was present at the time of the arrest.  The court noted that the 
officer knew Crossley’s credit card applications, water and electric bills, 
car registration, and mail listed Route’s residence as his current address 
and that the officer heard the television on inside the house after he 
arrested Route.104 Applying the lesser standard articulated in Pruitt, it is 
clear that the arresting officer, after considering “common sense factors 
and the totality of the circumstances” established that there was a 
“reasonable belief” that Crossley lived at Route’s residence and was 
present at the time of the arrest.105 Additionally, the information gathered 
by the arresting officer would have satisfied the probable cause test. 
Indeed, considering that the officer knew that Crossley’s credit card 
applications, water and electric bills, car registration and mail listed 
Route’s address as his current address and the officer heard the television 
                                                                                                             
 96 Id. at 485. 
 97 Id. at 483. See also United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Route, 104 
F.3d 59, 62–63 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216–17 (8th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995).   
 98 United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59 (5th Cir. 1997).   
     99  Id. at 61–62. 
 100 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 
1105, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 101 See Route, 104 F.3d at 61. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 62 n.1. 
 105 See United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2006). 
448 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:437 
on inside the house immediately after he arrested Route,106 the officer 
undoubtedly could make a common sense determination, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, that there is a fair probability that Crossley 
was within his home.107 It is clear that the arresting officer in Route could 
establish probable cause and satisfy Pruitt’s lesser standard. 
Even though probable cause and Pruitt’s lesser standard are similar 
tests, the difference between the two standards is extremely important in 
the few closer cases in which the standard used will affect the outcome. 
For example, the Sixth Circuit applied Pruitt’s lesser standard in United 
States v. McKinney.108 The court held that arresting officers had a 
“reasonable belief” that a suspect was on the premises where the police 
received an anonymous tip as to the suspect’s whereabouts and collected 
information a month before the arrest concerning the suspect’s “presence 
around the premises.”109 Under these circumstances, the court reasoned 
that the arresting officers, after considering “common sense factors and 
the totality of the circumstances,” established that there was a 
“reasonable belief” that the suspect was on the premises at that time.110 
Even though probable cause is not an onerous standard,111 the facts 
known to the officer in McKinney are not sufficient to establish probable 
cause. In order to have probable cause to enter a suspect’s home to 
execute an arrest warrant, police officers must make a common sense 
determination, based on the totality of the circumstances that there is a 
fair probability that the suspect is presently within his home.112 An 
anonymous tip as to the suspect’s whereabouts and month-old 
information concerning the suspect’s “presence around the premises,”113 
do not establish a fair probability that the suspect lives in the residence 
nor do they establish that the suspect will be present at the time of the 
search. Evidently, the standard used to evaluate the appropriateness of 
entering a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant will effect the 
outcome of the analysis in some closer cases. 
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E. Steagald v. United States: Protecting Third Parties’ Homes 
In Steagald v. United States, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
distinction between the protection of one’s person and one’s place under 
the Fourth Amendment when it held that police needed a search warrant 
to enter the home of a third-party not named in the arrest warrant in order 
to arrest a suspect.114 Although the Steagald holding only applies to 
situations where police seek to arrest a suspect in a third-party’s home,115 
its clearly drawn distinction between the protection of one’s person and 
one’s place is also relevant where law enforcement officers wish to enter 
a suspect’s own home.  
In January 1978, a DEA agent in Detroit received an anonymous tip 
that Ricky Lyons, a federal fugitive with an outstanding arrest warrant 
for drug charges, was in Atlanta, Georgia.116 The informant provided a 
phone number at which officers could contact Lyons.117 The agent 
relayed this information to an agent working in the Atlanta area, who 
obtained the address that corresponded to the phone number.118 On 
January 16, 1978, twelve officers descended upon the address and found 
Hoyt Gaultney and Gary Steagald outside.119 After determining that 
neither of the men was Lyons, several agents proceeded to the house 
where Gaultney’s wife let them in.120 The agents did not find Lyons in 
the house but they did discover cocaine.121 Armed with the cocaine as 
probable cause, one agent went to obtain a search warrant while the other 
agents conducted a second search, which uncovered additional 
incriminating evidence.122 After obtaining the search warrant, the agents 
conducted a third search in which they discovered an additional forty-
three pounds of cocaine.123 At trial, Steagald moved to suppress the 
evidence because “agents had failed to secure a search warrant before 
entering the house.”124 Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals denied Steagald’s motion and both Steagald and Gaultney 
were found guilty.125 
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The United States Supreme Court heard Steagald’s appeal.126 
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall held that the initial search of 
Steagald’s home violated his Fourth Amendment rights.127 Although both 
arrest warrants and search warrants “serve to subject the probable-cause 
determination of the police to judicial review,” the court reasoned that 
the warrants protect two distinct interests.128 The Court stated that arrest 
warrants “serve[] to protect an individual from an unreasonable seizure,” 
while search warrants “safeguard[] an individual’s interest in the privacy 
of his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the 
police.”129 In this case, Justice Marshall determined that, although the 
arrest warrant addressed Lyons’ interest in being free from an 
unreasonable seizure, it did not address Steagald and Gaultney’s interest 
in protecting their home from an unreasonable intrusion by police.130 
Indeed, the Court noted that the agents never submitted evidence that 
they could find Lyons inside the residence to a magistrate.131 Thus, the 
Court held that, “since warrantless searches of a home are impermissible 
absent consent or exigent circumstances,” the search of Gaultney and 
Steagald’s home violated their Fourth Amendment rights.132 
III. PROTECTING A SUSPECT’S HOME: EXTENSION OF STEAGALD 
A. Payton’s “Reason to Believe” is Probable Cause 
Even though probable cause and Pruitt’s lesser standard may 
produce a different outcome in only a small number of cases, the federal 
circuit courts must adopt a uniform test to account for the cases in which 
the standard applied will affect the outcome.133 The Ninth Circuit 
correctly held that Payton’s “reason to believe” language is equivalent to 
probable cause. Indeed, probable cause is the appropriate standard where 
police seek to enter a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant 
because probable cause sufficiently protects a suspect’s home from 
unreasonable intrusion,134 it provides a uniform standard for situations 
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where police seek to enter a private residence,135 and it provides an 
appropriate balance between citizens’ rights and the investigational 
requirements of law enforcement.136 Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
should clarify that Payton’s “reason to believe” language requires a 
showing of probable cause. 
1.  Probable Cause Protects a Suspect’s Home from Unreasonable 
Intrusion 
Probable cause is the appropriate standard where a law enforcement 
officer seeks to enter a suspect’s home to enforce an arrest warrant 
because probable cause sufficiently protects a suspect’s constitutional 
“interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the 
unjustified intrusion by the police.”137 Entry into one’s home to execute 
an arrest warrant implicates both the Fourth Amendment protection of 
one’s person and the Fourth Amendment protection of one’s home.138 
However, an arrest warrant protects a person only from an unreasonable 
arrest by requiring a showing of probable cause that the “subject of the 
warrant has committed an offense.”139 It does not protect one’s home 
from an unreasonable intrusion by police.140 
In order to adequately protect a suspect’s home, officers should 
have to establish probable cause, and not a lesser “reasonable belief” that 
the suspect is presently within his home. One’s home is the center of 
one’s private life and is entitled to special protection under the law.141 
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s home “from prying 
government eyes.”142 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment, at its core, gives 
citizens the right “to retreat into [their] own home” where they will be 
free from “even a fraction of an inch” of physical governmental 
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intrusion.143 To comply with the “reasonableness” requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, magistrates require police to establish probable 
cause before they will issue a search warrant permitting the arresting 
officers to invade the sanctity of one’s home.144 In Payton, the Court held 
that “an entry to arrest and an entry to search and to seize property 
implicate the same interest in preserving the privacy and the sanctity of 
the home, and justify the same level of constitutional protection.”145 
Therefore, adopting a standard below probable cause where law 
enforcement officers seek to enter a suspect’s home to enforce an arrest 
warrant would infringe on the suspect’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, adopting Pruitt’s lesser standard would reduce the 
protection of one’s home to a level below the standard contemplated in 
Payton.146 Accordingly, probable cause is the more appropriate standard 
because it sufficiently protects a suspect’s home from unreasonable 
intrusion. 
2. Probable Cause Provides a Uniform Standard for Situations 
Where Police Seek to Enter a Private Residence 
Additionally, probable cause is the more appropriate standard 
because it provides a uniform standard for situations where police seek to 
enter a private residence.147 A uniform standard “is essential to guide 
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on 
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific 
circumstances they confront.”148 Police must show probable cause in a 
variety of situations in which they wish to enter a private residence. For 
example, to obtain a search warrant, police must establish “probable 
cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a 
particular place . . . .”149 Additionally, in the circumstances where an 
officer may enter a home without an arrest warrant or search warrant to 
make an arrest, probable cause is an integral part of the analysis.150 In 
order to make such a warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest, an 
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officer must have “sufficient justification for a warrantless entry, a 
probable cause question”151 and “exigent circumstances [must] make it 
impossible or impracticable to obtain a warrant . . . .”152 Since police 
must establish probable cause in other situations where they wish to enter 
a home, requiring officers to establish probable cause where they seek to 
enter a suspect’s home to enforce an arrest warrant would provide a more 
uniform standard. Accordingly, probable cause is the more appropriate 
standard under these circumstances. 
3. Probable Cause Provides a Clear and Workable Standard for 
Police Officers 
Finally, probable cause is the more appropriate test because it 
provides a clear and workable standard for police officers. In instances 
where police seek to enter a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant, 
the officers often have “only limited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the social and individual interests involved” in this fact sensitive 
inquiry.153 Consequently, police officers require a standard that is both 
clear and workable.154 
The probable cause standard is clearer than Pruitt’s lesser standard. 
Law enforcement officers must establish probable cause in other 
situations where they wish to enter a private residence.155 The only thing 
that is clear about Pruitt’s lesser standard is that the courts define it as 
being “satisfied by something less than would be required for a finding 
of ‘probable cause.’”156 Consequently, implementing this lesser standard 
where law enforcement officials seek to enter a suspect’s home to 
enforce an arrest warrant would still require officers to think in terms of 
probable cause. Arresting officers would still be required to know the 
requirements of probable cause to determine if their suspicion meets a 
vague standard explicitly defined as requiring a lesser showing than 
probable cause.157 
Moreover, probable cause is a sufficiently workable standard.  
Using this standard, an arresting officer need only make a common sense 
determination, based on the totality of the circumstances that there is a 
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fair probability that the suspect is presently within his home.158 Probable 
cause is not an onerous standard.159 Indeed, it is an extremely deferential 
standard that requires far less evidence than “proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.”160 Adopting Pruitt’s lesser 
standard would loosen a standard that is already sufficiently deferential 
to law enforcement. Accordingly, probable cause is the more appropriate 
standard where law enforcement officials seek to enter a suspect’s home 
to execute an arrest warrant because probable cause provides an 
appropriate balance between citizens’ rights and the investigational 
requirements of law enforcement. 
B. Procedural Problem: Police Officers are Not Suited to Conduct the 
Probable Cause Analysis in an Objective Manner  
Even if the Supreme Court was to hold that “reason to believe” 
under Payton is equivalent to probable cause, the question remains: who 
is best equipped to conduct fact sensitive probable cause analysis? The 
Court previously held that an arresting officer may conduct the 
analysis.161 Indeed, because probable cause is a “common sense 
determination” that “deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act,’” it is reasonable to think that police officers would be 
more than capable of conducting the analysis.162 Nevertheless, law 
enforcement officers are ill equipped to conduct the probable cause 
analysis to determine the propriety of entering a suspect’s home to 
execute an arrest warrant because they are too involved in the criminal 
investigation to be objective.163 
Police officers are “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”164 Consequently, the interests and investigative 
needs of law enforcement officers are often in direct conflict with the 
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable arrests 
and free from unreasonable searches of their homes.165 The framers of 
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the Fourth Amendment recognized this inherent conflict of interests.166 
Accordingly, the second clause of the Fourth Amendment requires that a 
‘“neutral and detached’ magistrate review the facts and circumstances 
articulated by the officer to determine probable cause” before police may 
conduct a search, absent exigent circumstances.167 Allowing a police 
officer to make a subjective probable cause determination without 
objective oversight “significantly dilutes”168 citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights and allows room for potential abuse.169 For example, police may 
be able to use an arrest to enter a suspect’s home “even when they may 
believe the suspect is elsewhere, as a pretext to conduct a plain view 
search or protective sweep of the premises that could not otherwise be 
done because probable cause to search was lacking.”170 In order to ensure 
an objective determination of probable cause where law enforcement 
officers seek to enter a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant, the 
Supreme Court should require a level of judicial oversight. 
To effectively protect a suspect’s home from unreasonable intrusion 
where officers wish to execute an arrest warrant, the Supreme Court 
should extend the holding of Steagald to encompass situations where law 
enforcement officers seek to enter a suspect’s home to execute an arrest 
warrant.171 Indeed, courts should require arresting officers to obtain a 
search warrant from an objective magistrate before entering a suspect’s 
home to execute an arrest warrant and thus, enable the magistrate to 
conduct the probable cause analysis. The text of the Fourth Amendment 
separately protects one’s person and one’s place, therefore contemplating 
the need for separate safeguards of these rights.172 Requiring a search 
warrant in these circumstances would appropriately protect a suspect’s 
home and safeguard the rights of any other residents. Admittedly, this 
additional warrant requirement would represent a radical change in the 
law; however, it would ensure a level of objective oversight in the 
probable cause analysis. The Supreme Court should institute this 
additional warrant requirement because an arrest in one’s home 
implicates both the protection from unreasonable arrest and the 
protection of one’s home from unreasonable intrusion, it would provide a 
uniform application of the standard, and it would not unduly hinder law 
enforcement efforts. 
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C. An Arrest in One’s Home Implicates Both the Protection from 
Unreasonable Arrest and the Protection of One’s Home from 
Unreasonable Intrusion 
The Supreme Court should require arresting officers to obtain a 
search warrant from an objective magistrate before entering a suspect’s 
home to execute an arrest warrant because the situation involves two 
distinct protections. Indeed, entering a suspect’s home to arrest him 
“involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests, but also an 
invasion of the sanctity of the home.”173 Magistrates issue arrest warrants 
upon a showing of probable cause that the “subject of the warrant has 
committed an offense.”174 However, an arrest warrant “makes no 
determination as to probable cause to believe the suspect is anywhere in 
particular.”175 Although an arrest warrant protects a suspect from 
unreasonable arrest, it does not protect a suspect’s home from an 
unreasonable intrusion by police.176 
The Ninth Circuit correctly held that, in order to protect a suspect’s 
Fourth Amendment right to keep his home free from unreasonable 
intrusion by police, arresting officers need to establish probable cause 
before entering a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant.177 Public 
policy dictates the desirability of having an objective magistrate “pass on 
the question of probable cause . . . so [that] any search undertaken will be 
properly limited” in scope.178 Indeed, the judiciary is best equipped to 
ensure that any search is “strictly tied to and justified by the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”179 To 
adequately safeguard this right and eliminate the possibility of abuse by 
law enforcement officers, courts should require officers to obtain a 
search warrant in these situations before they enter a suspect’s home to 
arrest him. 
Search warrants are specifically designed to protect “an individual’s 
interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified 
intrusion of the police.”180 Under the Fourth Amendment, magistrates 
issue search warrants “upon a showing of probable cause to believe that 
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the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place.”181 
Indeed, the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to “‘particularly 
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”182 Since arresting officers must already adhere to the judicial 
process to obtain an arrest warrant in these situations, it would not be 
unreasonable to require an additional submission to the magistrate 
demonstrating probable cause “that the subject of the arrest warrant is 
present [in his home] at the time of the warrant’s execution.”183 This 
additional warrant requirement would potentially reduce the ability of 
law enforcement officers to use an arrest warrant as a pretext to conduct 
“a plain view search or protective sweep”184 of a suspect’s home because 
it would effectively bar officers from entering the suspect’s home until 
they are able to present sufficient evidence that there is a fair probability 
that the suspect is present.185 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should 
require arresting officers to obtain a search warrant from an objective 
magistrate before entering a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant. 
D. A Warrant Requirement Would Provide a Uniform Application of 
Probable Cause 
The Supreme Court should also require arresting officers to obtain a 
search warrant from an objective magistrate before entering a suspect’s 
home to execute an arrest warrant because it would provide a uniform 
application of the probable cause standard. Probable cause is not an 
overly “technical” standard.186 In theory, a police officer, based on his 
experience should be able to conduct a probable cause analysis where he 
seeks to enter a suspect’s home to make an arrest.187 Nevertheless, law 
enforcement officers are too involved in the criminal investigation to 
objectively conduct the analysis.188 Instituting a warrant requirement 
would ensure objective judicial review of the factual assumptions made 
by police. 
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Magistrates are learned jurists that are more apt than police to 
objectively make a common sense determination, based on the totality of 
the circumstances that there is a fair probability that the suspect is 
presently within his home. Magistrates would be better able to uniformly 
apply this standard, thus ensuring the maintenance of an appropriate 
balance between the investigative needs of law enforcement and the 
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens. Accordingly, The Supreme Court 
should require arresting officers to obtain a search warrant from an 
objective magistrate before entering a suspect’s home to execute an 
arrest warrant because magistrates would uniformly conduct the probable 
cause analysis in an objective manner. 
E. A Warrant Requirement Would Not Unduly Hinder Law Enforcement 
Efforts 
Finally, requiring arresting officers to obtain a search warrant from 
an objective magistrate before entering a suspect’s home to execute an 
arrest warrant would not unduly hinder law enforcement efforts. 
Although this requirement would safeguard criminal suspects’ Fourth 
Amendment rights, it would undoubtedly place a higher burden on law 
enforcement officers.189 Nevertheless, the allowance for warrantless 
searches where exigent circumstances exist would effectively maintain 
an appropriate balance between citizens’ rights and the investigative 
needs of law enforcement.190 The United States Supreme Court in both 
Payton and Steagald noted that police are not required to obtain search 
warrant where “exigent circumstances make it impossible or 
impracticable to obtain a warrant.”191 Exigent circumstances are those 
situations where there is “an articulable basis of a factual belief”192 that 
“there is a compelling need for official action.”193 Examples of “a 
compelling need for official action”194 include situations where police are 
in hot pursuit of a suspect, “lives are threatened, . . . or evidence is about 
to be destroyed.”195 Since the courts would excuse the search warrant 
requirement where exigent circumstances exist, the warrant requirement 
would not unduly hinder police where they seek to enter a suspect’s 
home to execute an arrest warrant. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The protection of one’s person and one’s place under the Fourth 
Amendment are fundamental. Nevertheless, the government has a 
countervailing need to effectively enforce its laws. Courts have the 
important task of maintaining the delicate balance between citizens’ 
rights and the investigational requirements of law enforcement. Different 
courts may reach different conclusions as to what the proper balance is, 
as the Sixth and Ninth circuits did in Pruitt and Gorman respectively.196 
After analyzing the substance and application of probable cause and 
Pruitt’s lesser standard, the difference between the standards is important 
in close cases where the standard applied may affect the outcome. 
The Supreme Court should clarify that Payton’s “reason to believe” 
language requires a showing of probable cause. Probable cause is 
superior to a lesser standard where law enforcement officers wish to 
enter a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant because probable 
cause protects a suspect’s home from unreasonable intrusion by police, 
provides a uniform standard, and provides an appropriate balance 
between a suspect’s rights and the investigational needs of law 
enforcement by presenting a clear and workable standard for law 
enforcement. Nevertheless, police are often too involved in the criminal 
investigation to objectively determine the propriety of entering a 
suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant. In order to sufficiently 
protect a suspect’s home, the Supreme Court should require officers to 
obtain a search warrant where they seek to arrest a suspect at home.  The 
Supreme Court should institute this additional warrant requirement 
because an arrest in one’s home implicates both the protection from 
unreasonable arrest and the protection of one’s home from unreasonable 
intrusion, it would provide a uniform application of the standard, and it 
would not unduly hinder law enforcement efforts. Although it would be a 
dramatic change in the law, this additional warrant requirement would 
provide objective oversight of the probable cause analysis and may 
reduce the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers. 
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